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It is difficult, if not impossible, to be neutral about Tanzania 
whatever judgment one wishes to make about its performance, there 
available data that will support the view. However, there is unanimity 
Tanzania finds itself in a desperate balance-of-payments situation in 
early 1980's even though explanations of the causes of the crisis 






Critics on the left attribute the crisis to failure to achieve a genuine 
socialist revolution so that an emergent bureaucr·atic class has come to 
exploit peasants to a degree that has become counterproductive to the 
viability of the system. i At the other end of. the ideological spectrum, 
critics allege that the problems have arisen from a misguided attempt to 
create socialism by a~andoning the free market in favor of centralized 
administrative control. Tanzanian leaders, and sympathetic observers, are 
arguing that the root of the problem lies,outside Tanzania in the world 
economic system in which it is at the mercy of markets which it cannot control 
and international institutions unable or unwilling to understand and be 
supportive of its social and economic goals. Given the declining prices of 
primary exports, and the rising prices of both oil and manufactured goods, 
Tanzania is caught with a sharply reduced capacity to import and. faces 
international institutions, particularly the IMF, that offer relief only at 
unacceptably high costs of imposing conditions that infringe on sovereignty 
and threaten to undermine continued pursuit of socialist development to meet 
the basic needs of the people. 3 Adverse movements in the terms of trade have 
been further exacerbated by bad weather and droughts in 1974 and again in 1980 
and 1981, placing additional demands on the economy to provide substantial 
imports of food. 
In order 
actions to be 
to assess 
taken both 
Tanzania's performance and to recommend remedial 
by the country and the international community, six 
questions must be asked: 
1. What are the implications of a basic needs strategy for economic 
structure, policies, and foreign trade? 
2. What has been the performance of the Tanzanian economy with respect 
to meeting basic needs of. the people? 
3. 
4. 
To what extent has the persistent 
caused by external events? What has 
balance-of-trade deficit been 
been the international response? 
To what extent has the balance-of-trade problem 
policies and events over which Tanzania has control? 
the domestic response? 
been caused by 
What has been 
I: 
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5. If Tanzania is to succeed in achieving its objective of meeting 
basic human needs, what actions must it take in the short and longer 
run in order to adjust to the structural imbalances now visible? 
6. If the international community is to assist (or at least 
obstruct) Tanzania in the achievement of its objectives, 
actions must be taken in both the short and longer run? 
Implications of a Basic-Needs Strategy 
not 
what 
There are two essential elements that must be present if the 
conventionally defined basic material needs of the population are to be met: 
the goods and services requisite to satisfaction of basic needs must be 
available nationally in the appropriate forms and quantities; there must also 
be a system by which these goods and services are made available to the people 
who require them. Thus the conventional exercise of establishing requirements 
for each basic need and translating that to a bill of goods that must be 
produced or imported is only half the story - it is also necessary to identify 
the means through which individuals and groups will be enabled to establish 
effective claims on the goods and services. 
In Tanzania, and in most developing countries, food, clothing, shelter, 
basic household goods, tools, transportation services, and inputs for 
production are made available to households either through their own 
production or through purchase with money. Health care, education, water 
supply, transportation infrastructure, and basic security are generally 
provided directly by government and households claim such services primarily 
through their residence in an administrative jurisdiction through which they 
are made available without additional cash payment. The degree to which the 
first category of basic needs will be satisfied depends therefore on the 
levels and distribution of real incomes (both own-production and monetary) in 
relation to the quantities of basic goods that can be purchased with cash 
incomes. The latter depends not only on cash incomes and prices, but also on 
availability of goods at those prices rationing systems provide an 
additional means of allocating these goods when total demands exceed supplies, 
given prices. The second category of basic needs satisfaction is dependent on 
the total level of these services provided by the public sector, the 
composition of these services, and their geographic distribution. 
An effective basic needs oriented development strategy is one which 
maximizes the satisfaction of basic needs at any point in time and, over time, 
increases the capacity to meet such needs. Since Tanzania does not presently 
have the productive capacity to meet all the basic needs of its people, it is 
forced to make tradeoffs between present satisfaction of basic needs and 
investment that will enable it to meet same needs in the future. In such a 
context it is quite incorrect to see basic needs and economic growth as 
conflicting objectives over any reasonable time horizon, but it is necessary 
to ask what kind of growth is required. 
The most important distinction between a conventional GDP growth strategy 
and one that concentrates on basic needs is the composition of goods and 
services available for final use. Food requires first priority. There must be 
adequate supplies to satisfy the nutritional requirements of the population 
which at low levels of real income means concentration on staple starches, 
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pulses, and oils, and inexpensive proteins, with relatively little emphasis on 
costly sources of proteins and highly processed foods. There must be capacity 
to provide those basic consumer goods which are defined by low-income people 
as essentials, such as soap, salt, sugar, cooking oil, kerosene, batte~ies, 
blankets, low-quality textiles and shoes, utensils, and simple furniture. For 
shelter, there must be supplies of essential materials used for basic shelter. 
There must be poles, some cement, door and window frames, roofing materials, 
simple hardware, and preservatives. In rural areas, farmers require the inputs 
and implements needed for production - seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and 
basic implements including pangas, hoes, and tillage implements. The tools, 
equipment, and materials must be available for producing the basic goods. 
Since every family in a village cannot be self-sufficient in all of these 
goods in every year, transportation must be available to move goods from areas 
of surplus to areas of deficit. Within rural areas transport is required for 
people to move to and from their fields, and to carry inputs to and collect 
outputs from the fields. Thus, a basic needs strategy implies a particular 
commodity composition of goods available for use. 
The other set of basic needs will be satisfied by the government, and a 
successful strategy requires that government provide basic education, health 
care, water supply, extension services, economic infrastructure of appropriate 
qualities to the majority (and eventually all) of the people. This means that 
the health system will have to concentrate more on low-cost preventive and 
simple curative care in rural areas with adequate supplies of medicines, than 
on hospital physician-based curative care. The same applies to the other 
services. In order to provide these services, there must be a means for 
mobilizing the real resources for use by government. 
If an economy is to enhance its capacity to meet more basic needs over time, 
some resources must also be mobilized to expand the capacity to provide these 
services over time. Hence, a successful strategy will have an investment 
program geared to increasing the capacity to produce and deliver the goods and 
services we have identified. 
Finally, an analysis of the role of exports is required. The only reason a 
country should ever want to export valuable goods or services is in order to 
import. If it were possible to import without exporting (to incur a balance of 
trade deficit), the total availability of goods to satisfy basic needs could 
be expanded, since resources could be diverted from producing exports to 
producing goods that are needed directly. Conversely, it was by forcing 
colonies to run balance of payments surpluses that metropolitan. countries 
extracted resources. Exports are best viewed as indirect processes of 
production, e.g., Tanzania produces petroleum via using domestic resources to 
produce coffee which is then exchanged with petroleum produces, and so on. 
Clearly, there are many products which Tanzania cannot produce at the present 
time although many might be domestically produced if specialized investment 
and training were undertaken. In times of drought or natural disaster, food 
has had to be imported in order to prevent starvation. The rule to be followed 
in determining whether to attempt to produce directly or indirectly through 
trade is to choose ~he method wh~ch provides the desired good with the least 
use of ·scarce domestic resources. Thus, the success of a country in achieving 
basic needs satisfaction should be judged not on the degree to which it 
produces exports but rather on the degree to which its imports contribute to 
achieving an appropriate level of commodity composition and level of goods 
available for final use. 
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It is likely that a basic needs strategy will require less international 
trade than conventional growth strategies because many basic demands can be 
met with much cruder "low-quality" goods than are acceptable in international 
trade, allowing for easier import substitution. Also, the set of final goods 
contain fewer luxury consumer goods and appliances that cannot be locally 
produced. However, even a very successful import substitution programme will 
not eliminate requirements for fuels, raw materials, machinery, transport 
equipment, chemicals, etc., all of which cannot be domestically produced 
economically. Thus, in context of a growing economy, a programme of import 
substitution will still generally require growth in the absolute levels of 
import requirements and failure to obtain such essential materials and 
intermediate goods may well cripple production of basic goods. 
If government is to provide basic needs such as education, health, water, 
and economic infrastructure there must be some means by which it gains command 
of the resources required. Schools and clinics must be built, medicines and 
textbooks provided, wells dug and pumps installed, roads built and 
maintained. Furthermore teachers, healthcare workers, engineers and 
hydrologists must be trained and paid - they in turn must be able to purchase 
their basic needs with their earnings. Some of these demands can only be met 
through imports so that some command of the export earnings is required. 
Domestic resources must be mobilized either through taxation or contributions 
in kind. If government cannot command such resources, it will be unable to 
provide these basic needs for which it has responsibility. In addition, 
government must satisfy the basic need for law and order, to plan and 
administer its operations, and to stimulate and guide the productive economy 
directly or indirectly. Furthermore, if a basic-needs strategy is to be 
pursued, systems of taxes and transfusers are necessary to insure that poorer 
and incapacitated groups are able to make effective claims for their share of 
basic needs goods and services. 
Such demands on government make it necessary that it be able to mobilize 
and allocate an increased share of national resources in the process of 
development. Tanzania's determination to build socialism reCfUires even 
greater ability of government to gain increasing control of the productive 
structure. 
II: Tanzania's Performance 
In assessing how well Tanzania has done in achieving basic needs 
satisfaction and growth, it is important to compare what has been achieved in 
relation to what could be achieved. Given its starting point at independence 
in 1961, or the levels achieved at 1967 when a major change of policy was 
announced through the Arusha Declaration, it is hardly surprising that basic 
needs have not been secured for all. One estimate for 1969 placed 88% of the 
Tanzanian households as being absolutely poor as reflected by their spending 
more than 60% of total income on food; 6 another 1969 study placed 20% of 
urban households and 65% of rural households as having less than a minimum 
budget,? while the FAQ estimates of the proportion of the population 
undernourished (per capita food intake less than 1500 calories per day) at 35% 
in both 1969 /71 and 72/7 4. 8 It is most appropriate therefore to compare 
Tanzania's progress over time in relation to the progress of other countries 
starting at about the same point. Table 1 shows some selected indicators for 
Tanzania in comparison with the average of countries classified by the World 
-5-
Bank as "Low Income Africa South of the Sahara." While these data are 
extremely fragile and many measures are criticized in other chapters of the 
report, the numbers are suggestive of Tanzania being poor but having achieved 
real growth of GNP per capita (which we will subsequently examine in detail), 
performing at or slightly below the average of similar countries with respect 
to food and nutrition, and being significantly better than others in health 
and education. Indicators that reflect Tanzania's distinctive commitment to 
basic needs are the slightly above average primary enrollment rates, sharply 
lower secondary enrollment rates, high adult literacy achievement, and low 
levels of passenger cars. These certainly reflect Tanzania's articulated 
policies which are in contrast with those of many other countries. 
Table 1: Selected Indicators of Tanzania's Basic Needs Performance 
Indicator 
GNP Per Capita 
Food Production per Capita 
(1969-71=100) 
Per Capita Supply of Calories 
(Per Cent of Requirement) 
Life Expectancy at Birth 
Access to Safe Water 
(% of Population) 
Urban 
Rural 
Population Per Physician 
Population Per Nurse 






Passenger Cars Per 
Thousand Population 
Tanzania 
















Low Income Africa 

















Source: World Bank, Economic Memorandum on Tanzania (January 23, 1981), 
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A case might be made on the basis of these figures that while Tanzania has 
made good progress in meeting those basic needs provided directly by 
government, it has been at the expense of economic production including food. 
Table 2 provides data on a range of economic indices compared with comparable 
weighted measures for all low income countries as classified by the World Bank 
- separate measures for Low Income Africa South of the Sahara are not 
available but are not much different on average. 
Emerging from these data is a picture of the Tanzanian economy performing 
better than average in aggregate. growth, including agriculture, manufacturing 
and services. Structural change has occurred in that agriculture has fallen 
as a share of GDP, while industry (which includes mining construction, 
transport electricity and water), manufacturing, and services have gained 
increased shares. The shift away from agriculture has been less marked than 
in other low income countries and the shift towards non-manufacturing 
industrial sectors relatively slight. As we will discuss later, the increase 
in manufacturing has been concentrated in industries providing basic consumer 
goods and some intermediate goods. Public consumption, which includes all 
government recurrent expenditure on health and education which should at last 
in fact be considered investment, has grown substantially since 1960 from 9 to 
14% which is greater than the average increase over the same period from 9 to 
12%. Gross domestic investment has also increased as a' share of GDP from 14 
to 20% which is comparable to average experience elsewhere. Given the high 
proportion of government participation in investment directly and through 
parastatal enterprises, the increases in public consumption and investment are 
consistent with governments' increased capacity to mobilize resources and gain 
control of critical sectors of the economy. On the other hand it may appear 
anomalous that private consumption increased sharply from 72 to 79% of GDP 
while in other countries it was declining from 80 to 73%. This was possible 
in Tanzania because of the sharp drop in domestic savings from 19 to 7% while 
other poor countries were raising their savings rates from 11 to 15%. 
The mirror image of increased private consumption, sustained investment, 
and falling savings has been the growing balance of trade deficit caused by 
exports declining in constant value terms at a 6% rate during the 1970's while 
real imports declined only at 1%; exports declined from 31 to 15% of GDP 
(other countries raised their rate from 10 to 12%) while imports increased 
from 26 to 28% of GDP (compared with an increase in other countries from 13 to 
18%). The difference between imports and exports has been made up by inflow 
of foreign resources in form of grants, concessional loans, and commercial 
credits plus changes in revenue and use of IMF standby facilities. While we 
will examine finance of the deficit in more detail later, it is evident from 
the low burden of debt service (which has in fact fallen between 1960 and 1978 
as a proportion of both GDP and of exports, and at levels well below that of 
other poor countries despite Tanzania's higher than average rate of net 
foreign inflow) that the foreign inflow has come on highly concessional 
terms. In fact, the amounts of foreign inflow in form of direct foreign 
investment and commercial lending have been insignificant while the mix of ODA 
(official development assistance) has had a very high concessional 
component.9 
If these data are taken at face value, they are consistent with a good, if 
not spectacular, performance in meeting basic needs. They depict Tanzania's 
economy achieving per capita growth resulting in increased domestic 
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consumption of food (given the high apparent growth of agriculture and decline 
of export crops) and basic manufactured goods (as shown by the composition of 
the growing manufacturing output); rising capacity of government to mobilize 
resources and to deploy them in basic needs areas such as health, education 
and water supply; and a maintained high rate of investment, This achievement 
in meeting basic needs while maintaining investment has been made easier by 
Tanzania's receipt of considerable levels of external assistance which allowed 
import levels to be almost maintained while domestic resources have been 
released from export production for use in producing domestically-required 
goods, 
Table 2: Selected Indicators of Economic Performance: 
Tanzania and All Low Income Countries 
Low Income Countries 
Indicator Tanzania (Weighted Average) 
Real GNP Per Capita: 1978 Dollars 230. 200. 
Average Annual Growth Rate 60-78 2,7 1,6 
Real GDP Growth Rate 60-70 6,0 3.9 
70-78 s.o 3.6 
.Agriculture Growth Rate 70-78 4,5 2.0 
Manufacturing Growth Rate 70-78 4,5 4,2 
Services Growth Rate 70-78 6,4 4,3 
% of GDP in Agriculture 1960 57 50 
1978 51 38 
% of GDP in Industry 1960 11 17 
1978 13 24 
% of GDP in Manufacturing 1960 5 11 
1978 9 13 
% of GDP in Services 1960 32 33 
1978 36 38 
% of GDP Going To: 
Public Consumption 1960 9 9 
1978 14 12 
Private Consumption 1960 72 80 
1978 79 73 
Gross Domestic Investment 1960 14 14 
1978 20 21 
Gross Domestic Savings 1960 19 11 
1978 7 15 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Indicator 
Low Income Countries 
Tanzania (Weighted Average) 
Exports of Goods+ Nonfactor Services 
Resource Balance 
Imports** 
Annual Percentage Growth 
of Real Exports 
Annual Percentage Growth 
of Real Imports 
Terms of Trade (1970=100) 
Percent Share of Exports in: 
Fuels and Minerals 
Other Primary Commmodities 
Percent Share of Imports in: 
Food 
Fuels 
Other Primary Commodities 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 
Other Manufactures 
Current Balance of Payments 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Before Interest Payments: 
























































*Resource Balance= Savings - Investment= Exports - Imports 
**Calculated: Imports= Exports - Resource Balance 























While this rosy assessment of achievement is plallsible in light of the 
available data, it is incumbent on the reader to recall that "there are three 
kinds of lies: lies, damn lies, and statistics." Clearly all of these data 
are weak and must be taken as, at best, indicators of rough orders of 
magnitude and direction of change. It is also not impossible that they are 
misleading even at that gross level. Other chapters of this report examine 
critically most of these indicators and provide reasons for taking them with 
caution, Indeed, careful examination of these data in more detail suggest 
deep fissures lurking close beneath the calm surface. 
First, agricultural performance has not been as steady and buoyant as the 
4,5% per annum growth rate from 70 to 78 reported in Table 2 would indicate. 
Furthermore, it seems hardly consistent with the reported decline in food 
production per capita reported in Table 1 plus the 6% annual decline in real 
exports which is dominated by agricultural products. The chapter of this 
report by Davidson Gwatkin dealing with health and nutrition concludes 
cautiously that there is no strong evidence in favour of either a rising or 
falling trend in nutrition levels or food availability, and the chapter on 
employment by Jaime Mezzera in Table A,l estimates an average annual growth 
rate per capita value added in traditional agriculture between 1975 and 1980 of 
7. 4%. Add to this the fact that food imports have increased over the period 
and fluctuated sharply from year to year and it would appear that either any or 
no conclusion can be drawn - confusion reigns supreme. 
Some order may be imposed on this chaos by more careful attention to some 
details. First, weather is variable in Tanzania and major droughts have 
occurred every 5-7 years. A severe drought hit in 1974-75 causing imports of 
food grains to rise sharply in 73/74 and 74/75, as shown in Table 3, rising 
from 8.1% of total imports in 1973 to 20% in 1974, 17.7% in 1975, and declining 
back to 8.2% in 1976. Examination of the actual imports in 80/81 and projected 
for 81/82 alongside substantial drops in domestic purchases of maize and rice 
shows the reappearance of unfavourable weather after a series of good years in 
76-79. The central events of recent Tanzanian macro economic history has been 
response to external shocks in both weather, oil prices, and other commodity 
prices .10 Green, Rwegasira, and van Arkadie argue that the basic strategy 
was that the 1974/75 drought coinciding with the 1974 oil price increases gave 
a huge shock to the economy, which it managed quite well, and was back on a 
successful growth path by 1977-78. That view is consistent with the 
performance data we have examined earlier. 
Another fact that gives rise to consternation and to many, disbelief, is 
that according to the National Accounts, growth of agriculture in 1966 prices 
was 4-9% per annum from 1970-1979 but this consisted of monetary agriculture 
growing only at 2,1% and "subsistence" agriculture experienced a growth of 
7.1%: This also has the effect of showing growth of total GDP accelerating 
after 1973, while the rate of monetary GDP growth decelerated. While many 
observers, including the World Bank, dismiss this observation by refusing to 
believe that subsistence agriculture can possibly grow that fast, it is 
important to recognize that this term "subsistence" covers all production not 
marketed through official channels. All observers agree that parallel markets 
have become increasingly important in the last half of the ?O's. But that is a 
fact of great importance for even though it may well mean that the poor in the 
rural sector are producing the consuming more food, hence satisfying the most 
basic need for the neediest sector of the population, the ability of government 
to mobilize resources for providing the other basic needs may be seriously 
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Table 3: Imports, Exports, and Domestic Purchases of Grains 
MA I Z Ea W HE A Ta RIC Ea 
Domestic Domestic 
Food as 
Domestic % of Total 









































































(a) In 000 metric tons, Source: James Mudge, Michael Crusswell, and Kwan 
Kim, Tanzania Development Performance and Implications for Development 
Assistance (Washington: US agency for International Development, 
November, 1980) - Tables. 
(b) Figures shown are mid-range of a variety of estimates by different 
sources. 
(c) Source: World Bank, Economic Memorandum on Tanzania, January, 1981 Table 
3-5, We have equated crop year 72/73 with calendar year 1973 etc, 
(d) Bank of Tanzania, "Economic Management Report No, S," June, 1981, 
(e) Bank of Tanzania, 80/81 actual, 81/82 estimates, 
Finally, even though the 1974-75 crisis had apparently been weathered and 
performance seemed quite good by 1979, a new and more serious set of shocks 
arose, In late 79 and early 80 a new set of OPEC oil price increases hit just 
as Tanzania was realizing that liberalization of imports in 1978 had caused 
the level of imports to increase out of control, and the coffee boom came to a 
precipitous halt. This is the current crisis, admirably described in the 
chapter by Dr, Frances Stewart so that we needn't report what she has laid 
out. It is difficult, however, to predict whether 79/80 represents the 
beginning of a new epoch, or whether it will be a temporary shock as that of 
74-75 proved to be, 
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It is possible to argue that the recovery after 1975 was largely luck• 
Substantial amounts of food aid eased the burden of accelerated food imports 
although reimbursement came late. As food production returned to normal, the 
commodity boom that followed the OPEC oil price increases swelled export 
revenues despite export quantities that continued falling. By 1977, the 
prices of Tanzania's main exports particularly coffee, had more than 
compensated for the earlier oil increases and by 1977 the terms of trade were 
30% better than they had been in 1973. However, 1977 was the high point for 
the terms of trade and by 1978 they were back to the 1973 level and have 
continued to drop ever since as oil prices accelerated again in late 1979 and 
coffee prices slipped substantially. As we shall explore in the next section, 
this recovery of prices and substantial inflows of concessional assistance 
masked the fact that export performance has steadily deteriorated with 
consequent erosion of the ability to import essential raw materials, fuel, 
intermediate goods, and capital equipment. The squeeze since 1977 has been 
precipitate but in reviewing Dr. Stewart's chapter, one must be aware that her 
base year, 1977 was a very unusual one and the events of 1980-81, rather than 
being a temporary shock, reflect the reality of declining import capacity that 
has been in fact a trend since 1973 and was merely masked by the unusual 
events of 76-78. 
Barring major discoveries of oil or a dramatic reorientation of the 
international economic order, Tanzania has to come to grips with the fact that 
although oil prices will not rise appreciably for some time, they will 
probably not continue to decline as they have in 1981; given the outlook for 
the world economy in the first half of the 80' s, a new commodity boom is 
unlikely; and the prospects for substantial increases in concessional aid 
flows are weak indeed given the onset of a new ice age with respect to the 
third world in Washington and London. Therefore it is imperative that 
Tanzania assess correctly the options open to it; that long-run structural 
adjustment required to make real the commitment to basic needs be identified 
and brought about; that short run adjustments be consistent with long-term 
requirements; and that the resources of the international community be brought 
to bear on Tanzania's behalf. Whether 1980-81 represents the beginning of a 
new epoch or merely the postponed recognition of an old epoch, it is 
imperative that the situation be analyzed and action taken based on reality. 
III: The Crisis: External Causes and Response 
Table 4 contains several series of data describing Tanzania's foreign 
trade position from 1973 on and some of the series are also plotted in Figure 
1. As was mentioned in the previous section, Tanzania's terms of trade have 
exhibited considerable fluctuations in recent years, falling sharply in 1975 
from the oil price increases, recovering and surpassing the 1973 level in 1977 
and falling steadily from 1978 onwards.12 The consequences of falling terms 
of trade are evident - more valuable domestic resources have to be used to 
"produce" a unit of imports via exports. If imports are to be maintained 
additional resources must be diverted from other uses; if resource use in the 
export sector remains constant, command over imports falls, 
Tanzania's ability to import via exporting has shown a downward trend 
over this period with 1976 and 1977 representing a temporary exception albeit 
at levels lower than 1973. It is evident from Figure 1 that the overriding 
reason for this decline is the steady downward trend of export quantities with 
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1975 and 76 representing a small and temporary exception. Thus the dominant 
feature of this period is the erosion of the absolute level of import capacity 
in face of population and economic growth. We will discuss further the 
significance of imports in the next section but at this point it is sufficient 
to note that by 1976, there was little in Tanzania's import bill that could 
easily be considered unessential in context of a basic needs strategy. 
Table 4: Tanzania's Foreign Trade 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 _!2I! 1979 1980 
Export Quantity (1976-78=100) 137 
Export Unit Value (1976-78•100) 51 
Import Unit Value 54 
Terms of Trade 94 








































101 Total Imports (76-78•100) 
Total Imports (76-68 Export 
Commanded=lOO) 
Ratio Imports/Exports 
174 175 168 140 150 206 170 166 
1.35 1.87 2.05 1.28 1,37 2.39 2.02 2.28 
Export Quantity if Growth at 
3% p.a. 






150 154 159 164 169 
140 182 151 146 142 
Sources: World Bank, Economic Memorandum on Tanzania, 1981, Bank of 
Tanzania, Economic Operation Report, June 1980 plus update from BOT, 
However, Tanzania's capacity to import has not been limited to its 
export-revenue generation. In Figure 1, it is evident that actual imports 
have been considerably higher than the imports commanded by exports by large, 
fluctuating, and generally increasing margins, The figure shows clearly that 
in the period Tanzania has enjoyed large 3nd growing balance of trade 
deficits. Now it is common to describe these deficits as a problem for 
Tanzania - the real case is quite the reverse, The deficits have been a 
blessing, the real problem is that they could not have been larged To refer 
again to our earlier discussion, real goods availability will be increased if 
a country can obtain imports without having to direct domestic resources from 
other uses in order to produce exports, This is certainly true if such excess 
imports are provided freely with no conditions placed on their use or 
reciprocal obligations incurred by receipt, Alas, there are few ways in this 
world through which countries like Tanzania can find such largesse, If the 
deficits are not financed through free gifts, the terms on which excess 
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deficit may well be questioned. Proposals for automatic transfer of some of 
the world's resources to poor countries through internationalization of income 
tax have not fared well in the recent debates on the international economic 
order and, despite Tanzania's efforts to raise these issues to the fore in 
international discussions, a realistic observer will have great difficulty 
persuading himself that the prospects are much better than nil for substantial 
progress in the foreseeable future.14 Probably the most effective "policy" 
that Tanzania could adopt is to find significant quantities of oil, Obtaining 
economic rents from mineral deposits or other natural advantages represents 
generation of import capacity without having to divert domestic factors from 
other production and gives the country discretion on how such import capacity 
is to be used. However, that even such a bonanza does not solve all problems 
is evident from the exporience of the oil exporters.15 But the problem 
facing such countries is how to use such import capacity effectively for basic 
needs and development. In the Tanzanian case that is not a problem at the 
moment. As we will discuss in a later section, and as Dr. Stewart's chapter 
points out, the ability to meet basic needs is seriously constrained at 
present by foreign exchange shortage. That is the essence of the crisis. 
How has Tanzania 
export-generated level? 
maintained import capacity well in excess 
Tables 5-9 provide some of the answers. 




1966 1973 1980 66 to 73 75 to 80 
Merchandise Exports 722 659 370 -63 -289 
Net Invisible Receipts -33 15 19 48 4 
Gross Aid Disbursements 69 224 377 155 153 
Other Capital Flows, Errors, 
and Omissions -17 69 -6 86 -75 
Import Capability 741 967 760 226 -207 
Use of Reserves -83 -76 84 7 160 
Actual ImEorts 658 891 844 233 -47 
Source: World Bank, Economic Memorandum on Tanzania, January 1981, Table 3.4, 
p. 56. 
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Table 6: Export Earnings and Total Imports 
(Value in Tsh. million, current prices 
1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 198oa 1981a 
Total Imports 2274 3375 5339 5711 5283 6208 8816 9072 10040 10179 
Total Exports 1852 2496 2861 2790 4126 4532 3685 4484 4335 4476 
Imports/Exports 1,23 1. 35 1.87 2.05 1.28 1.37 2.39 2.02 2.32 2,27 
Source: World Bank Economic Memorandum on Tanzania, January 1981, Table 3.1, P• 89. 
aBank of Tanzania, Financial Plans 1981/82 Actual, 1981 revised plan. 
Table 7: Gross Aid Disbursements to Tanzaniaa (US Million, Current Prices) 
Estimates 
1970 .ill!. 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 .ill§_ 1979 
Loans: 40.7 47.9 99,0 97,5 143,1 231,9 106.1 175,2 147,8 139,5 
Bilateral 30,0 32.6 80.4 84,9 120.7 164.3 66.7 96,2 69.6 4S.4 
Multilateral 10. 7 15,3 18,6 12,6 22.3 67,6 39.4 79,l 78,2 94,1 
Grants: 6.2 6,8 9.8 23.6 51.8 127.7 119,0 135,0 214,l 321,4 
Bilateral "S:9 6-4 9,6 23.3 50,3 103.9 105,5 122.7 192,1 294.4 
Multilateral 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 1,5 23.8 13,5 12.3 22.0 27,0 
Total of total 46,9 54.7 108,8 121.1 194,9 359.6 225.l 310.2 361.9 460. 9 
Percent from: 
Bilateral loan 64 60 74 70 62 46 30 31 19 10 
Multilateral loan 23 28 17 11 11 9 18 25 22 20 
Bilateral grant 13 12 9 19 26 29 47 40 53 64 
Multilateral grant - 1 7 6 4 6 6 
aExcludes receipts from suppliers, credits, financial institutions, bonds, and 
technical cooperation, 
Source: World Bank, Economic Memorandum on Tanzania, January 1981, Table 4.3, 
p. 100. 
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Table 8: Sources of Gross Aid Disbursement to Tanzania, 1979 (US$ million) 
Source 
Loans 
Bilateral (of which) 
OECD Countries 
China (People's Republic) 



















































Table 9: Debt Service, 1980 
Exports of Goods 4355.0 
Exports Net Services 156.0 
Net Exports 4501.0 
Capital Outflow and Debt Service 





Supplier's Credit Outflows: 
Parastatals 
Private 
Other Net Capital Movements(a) 
Total Debt Service 
Debt Services/Net Exports~ 12.2% 
! 
243.3 









art is not clear what these other capital movements refer to so they'have 
been treated as though they were debt service or repatriation of profit by 
foreign direct investers. If they are not included in debt services, the 
ratio falls to 11.4%. 
Table 5 shows clearly that between 1966 and 1973 there was an actual 
increase in real imports despite a small fall in exports earnings as a result 
of a large increase in Gross Aid, a smaller but significant net capital inflow 
other than aid, and reserves were also increased modestly. Between 1973 and 
1980 real imports declined but much less than net exports because of large 
increase in aid and a substantial reduction in reserves and despite a negative 
flow on other capital accounts. As shown in Table 6, imports exceeded exports 
substantially in 1975 and from 1978 to the present exports have paid for less 
than half of imports. While we have argued that the balance of trade deficit 
is not really a problem~~• the fact that part of that deficit has been 
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financed by running down reserves, and that net reserves are now negative, 
does present a problem because that source of finance is exhausted. 
In fact the international response to Tanzania's problems has been in the 
form of sharply increasing official development assistance in both loans and 
grants. Unlike many developing countries, Tanzania has made little use of 
commercial borrowing, a matter to which we will return later. That not only 
has the quantity of aid increased, but that it has come on increasingly "soft" 
terms is evident in Table 7. The major shift has been from loans to grants in 
both bilateral and multilateral programs which have maintained about the same 
overall ratios. Within these categories, the sources of aid in 1979 which, on 
inspection, provides several surprises. The most evident anomaly is that 
despite its sociali.st policies, Tanzania receives no grants from socialist 
countries and loans only from China.16 The other curiousus is the absence 
of grants and miniscule levels of loans from OPEC countries and the OPEC 
related multilateral sources. OECD countries are the principal sources of 
both loans and grants with grants accounting for more than six times the level 
of loans. 
While the World Bank group is by far the largest source of multilateral 
lending, and the mix of lending between IBRD and IDA suggests a rather large 
concessional element, it is significant to note that Swed.en and the 
Netherlands gave more in grants in 1979 than all multilateral lending and 
grants combined. In fact, just five small countries, Sweden, Netherlands, 
Norway, Canada, and Denmark, provide over 40 percent of all aid, both loans 
and grants, entirely in the form of grants. USAID estimates that some 98 
percent of Tanzania's aid is grant-equivalent.17 The high degree of 
concessionality, and the virtual absence of commercial borrowing, has meant 
that debt services have claimed only 12.2 percent of export revenues in 1980 
which is a relatively modest figure. 
On the face of these data, one can conclude that Tanzania has received 
significant amounts of aid on highly concessional terms - the international 
minority has in fact been much more responsive to Tanzania's needs than to 
most poor countries. However, it must be realized that aid does not represent 
general command over imports for Tanzania but is largely tied to specific 
projects and frequently to specific sources of imports. Thus it is necessary 
to "look the gift horse in the mouth." As Green, Rwegasira and van Arkadie 
observe, "while the overall figures are part of the truth they [levels of 
foreign assistance] are deceptive, concealing inadequacies with respect to 
timing, certainty, mobilization-cost and micro efficiency consideration. "18 
Not only do aid contributions have economic strings and requirements that make 
them less than fungible, they also carry political strings than can turn a 
gift horse into a Trojan horse( This is put forcefully by von Freyhold who 
argues that: 
"The World Bank has shown in Tanzania that it was not opposed 
to state ownership as such, but to state plannin.; and 
workers' or peasants' collective participation in economic 
decision-making. The social stratum that controlled the 
state and parastatal economy had similar views and found the 
World Bank a helpful ally. If the Tanzanian State had really 
attempted to bring about 'Socialism and Self-reliance', it 
would have had more difficulties in getting appropriate 
external support."19 
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While one might well question her assessment, the point is valid that donors 
respond differently to various political strategies, that they try subtly or 
overtly to influence policies and development strategy, and that their motives 
in providing aid are not dominated solely by generosity. The question of 
conditionality is at the heart of Tanzania's current impasse with the IMF. 
Whatever the merits Tanzania has argued that the economic assistance offered 
carries a high price of infringement of sovereignty.20 
The dominant feature of aid is that it has been almost exclusively tied to 
providing capital costs of new projects. Yet even gift horses required care 
and feeding.21 If resources for fodder are scarce, diversion from more 
valuable uses will occur and the "gift horse" may well become a "white 
elephant"! While avoiding these ridiculous flights of metaphor, Dr. Stewart 
has identified the pressing requirement for Tanzania to cancel many ongoing 
projects and to put. a moratorium on many new ones. If aid donors would 
readily shift their contributions from projects to general import support, at 
least in the short run, the situation would be eased; she correctly assumes, 
however, that this is not the case and that Tanzania might be well advised to 
forego aid which is in fact costly to absorb. 
In summary, the international response has been very favorable to 
Tanzania, at least in aggregate terms. As a result, the country has 
maintained a high investment rate in face of declining domestic savings. 
Command over imports has not declined to the extent that export earnings have 
dwindled, But the maintenance of import levels partly masks the crisis which 
consists of sharply curtailed capacity to import fuels, raw materials, and 
intermediate goods required to operate the capacity in place, while 
aid-provided imports continued to build more capacity which cannot be 
effectively used, 
IV: The Crisis: Internal Causes and Response 
It should be quite clear from the foregoing discussion that the principal 
cause of the crisis has been the longer-term structural decline of the export 
sector, While deteriorating terms of trade since 1977, partial crop failures 
in 80 and 81, and the war with Uganda greatly exacerbated the situation, there 
is no escaping that failure to arrest declines in export production have had a 
dominant effect, 
In Figure 1 and Table 4, a series is shown which calculates the command 
over imports that would have been generated had exports grown at the modest 
real rate of 3 percent per annum - a rate lower than average annual increase 
of marketed food production and much lower than the growth rate for 
subsistence production. This shows that at such a growth rate for real 
exports, and given the changes in terms of trade that have occurred, exports 
could have commanded 2.3 times as many real imports in 1980 than were 
commanded by actual exports in that year; alternatively, if imports remained 
at actual 1980 levels (an undesirable option), export earnings would cover 86 
percent of imports instead of the actual 44 percent, To take another 
hypothetical alternative, had terms of trade remained at the 1973 level, and 
export quantities moved as they have, 12 percent more imports could be 
commanded by exports in 1980 than is the case, If exports had grown at 3 
percent and if current levels of aid continued to be offered, in 1980, total 
imports would be 30 percent higher than the actual, reserves would not be 
drawn down, and exports would be financing 67 percent of total imports. 
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While it is easy to make any number of counterfactual assumptions to play 
out "what might have been if only" games it is necessary to point out that 
Tanzanian planners systematically made widely optimistic projections of export 
crop performance with little, if any, attention being paid to formulation and 
implementation of these projections. Table 10 shows some of the projections 
that were used and it is, at least in retrospect, difficult to understand how 
third five year plan estimates failed to be adjusted significantly in face of 
gross underfulfillment of second plan targets. Had these targets been 
fulfilled, the subject of this chapter would undoubtedly be about the problem 
of Tanzania's having devoted too many resources to export production resulting 
in excessive use of imports at the expense of meeting basic needs! 
Table 10: Targeted and Actual Growth Rates for the Major Export Crops 
in the Second and Third First Year Plan Periods(% growth p.a. for quantities 
SFYP (1969-74) TFYP (1976-81) 
Crop Target Actual Target Actual 
Coffee 6.0 -3.1 7.5 2.5 
Cotton 16.1 -2.0 14.4 -0.1 
Sisal 0.6 -6.0 17,5 -6.9 
Cashew 10.0 7.0 14.2 -6.9 
Tea 9.0 5.8 12.1 4.0 
Tobacco 25.0 10.1 18.8 -0.1 
Pyrethrun 4.0 1,6 25.2 -4,4 
Source: DEVPLAN. 
Table reproduced from Ellen E, Hanack, The Tanzania Balance of Payments 
Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Lessons for a Survival Strategy. University 
of Dar es Salaam. MA Dissertation, 1981. 
A word is in order about the use and misuse of particular base years in 
identifying trends. The results of this exercise would look different if 
different base years had been chosen: from a 1975 base year, the 1980 terms 
of trade would still represent an improvement; Frances Stewart's paper 
emphasises the swift deterioration of terms of trade given 1977, the all time 
high, as the base point. The latter is quite appropriate for demonstrating 
the abruptness of the turnaround which explains why there is an immediate 
crisis. For examining longer trends, and particularly for assessing the 
relative importance of external conditions beyond Tanzania's control (the 
terms of trade) and :!.nternal. performance which could have been affected by 
policy (export quantities), the 1973 base year is appropriate, There seems to 
be general agreement that it was a normally good year, the mini-crisis of 
71-72 had been weathered, food supply was adequate, the balance of trade 
deficit corresponded to available aid levels and reserves seemed 
adequate.22 It was the base year against which the crisis of 74-75 was 
measured and most of the comments about deterioration of the terms of trade 
raised in 80-81 with respect to 77 were echoed in the discussions of 74-75 
with respect to 73. 
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The conclusions of our analysis seem well founded. While external events 
contributed greatly to the onset and severity of the current crisis, the 
fundamental structural problem that could hardly have been avoided even under 
favourable external conditions, is the failure of export performance. As 
Green et. al. state: "The re-emergence of an alarming balance of payments 
situation in 1978 might be seen as a short-term phenomenon •••• However, it 
is of particular significance as a demonstration of an underlying structural 
deficit in the balance of payments and is not to be viewed as mainly an issue 
of short-term economic management. "23 
The long term in fact consists of a continuous series of short runs; no 
economy ever finds itself at a point in time that can be identified as the 
long run. Rather each short term unfolds into another short term; each is 
dependent on its predecessor and in turn determines the fate of its 
successor. Policy at each point in time must be devoted to solving immediate 
problems without creating more difficult ones for the future. This point has 
been clearly recognised by Stewart in her paper, and her analysis of short 
term measures is consistent with the long-run view of this chapter. Still it 
is necessary to spell out in some detail the roots of the structural problem 
so as to identify policies that will enable basic needs to be met on a 
sustained basis. 
The generally accepted facts of recent Tanzanian economic performance is 
that export crop production has fallen; food production for the market 
increased substantially through 1979 until bad weather depressed crop 
marketing in 1980 and 81; essential consumer goods have become unavailable in 
rural areas through official channels; industrial output has fallen since 1980 
as a result of incapacity to obtain essential inputs, fuel and spare parts; 
transport has become a serious bottleneck with a growing portion of the rail 
and road-haulage capacity unserviceable for lack of maintenance, spare parts 
and fuel; that despite rising margins between selling and buying prices, crop 
marketing authorities have incurred large losses covered by borrowing from the 
banking. system; that government revenues have fallen relative to expenditure 
causing large recurrent-budget deficits; and that there has been widespread 
disengagement from the official markets resulting in some combination of 
increased non-marketed production for own consumption in the rural areas and 
flourishing parallel markets for both agricultural and consumer goods. 
A plausible explanation of these events revolves around the following 
dynamics.24 As inflationary pressures mounted after 1974, producer prices 
for cash crops were not adjusted quickly enough to prevent rapid deterioration 
of real prices for small-scale farmers who produce the vast majority of the 
cash crops. At the same time, incentives were given for expanded marketing of 
food crops, particularly maize, and sorghums and millets. There was in fact 
substitution of food crop marketing for cash crop marketing as shown by the 
data in Tables 11 and 12. Although the increased food production allowed a 
sharp reduction in food imports after 1975, because a high proportion of food 
imports had been provided under special concessional international assistance 
arrangements, the reduction in food imports failed to compensate for the 
reduction in exports, thereby making foreign exchange shortages more severe. 
The liberalization of imports in 1978, coinciding with the precipitous 
termination of the coffee boom substantially increased industrial capacity 
without providing imports necessary for using the new capacity. Furthermore, 
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imports had in fact been very compressed for several years as that there was 
incomplete replenishment of required stocks and replacement of worn-out 
equipment in many sectors. As import licensing became more restrictive, 
production of basic consumer goods fell and capacity utilization plummeted due 
to reduced availability of essential inputs. Meanwhile a high rate of new 
investment continued, largely funded by international assistance but requiring 
counterpart resources and foreign exchange inputs from Tanzania thereby 
compressing availability of recurrent inputs. 
The transportation sector similarly came under pressure from poor 
maintenance compounded by lack of spare parts, petrol was scarce, maintenance 
of the road and rail infrastructure was grossly inadequate so that collection 
of agricultural outputs and delivery of inputs and basic consumer goods to the 
rural areas became increasingly problematical and reports from rural areas 
repeatedly stressed the frequent unavailability of essential goods at any 
price as well as the growing importance parallel markets. Furthermore, there 
were frequently cited instances of marketable crops not being collected by 
crop marketing authorities and of farmers not being paid cash at the time of 
delivery to the authorities, Therefore, the farmers beat a hasty retreat from 
many of the official sectors of marketing, 
Table llt Output and Real Producer Prices, Selected Crops 












Officially Marketed Output Average 























Note: Prices are official produced prices paid to farmers deflated by the National 
Consumer Price Index, This table duplicates Tables 5 and 6 in Stewart, 
But this process can quickly develop into a self-reinforcing spiral, As 
farmers withdraw from the official markets, foreign exchange becomes still 
more scarce, Therefore, allocations of inputs, spares, and fuel are further 
restricted and production of essential consumer goods, availability of 
agricultural inputs, and transportation capacity is further reduced which in 
turn reduces further import capacity. As this sequence of events keeps 
repeating and intensifying at each iteration, a serious situation becomes 
desperate, a structural decline becomes a crisis, 
Table 12: Real Producer Prices and Marketed Output for Selected Crops 
(Indices 1970/71 c 100) 
70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 
Maize: 
Producer Price 100 88 88 101 130 157 153 140 130 136 124 
Marketed Output 100 - 197 137 44 169 236 395 412 - 194 
Paddx:: 
Producer Price 100 86 86 78 76 91 86 92 82 91 97 
Marketed Output 100 - 160 131 50 26 27 54 59 - 27 
I Sorghum: 
" " I Producer Price 100 - 88 133 124 133 149 149 135 117 107 
Marketed Output - - 100 178 317 483 1760 5600 9967 - 3150 
Cotton: 
Producer Price 100 95 97 82 70 72 91 81 83 77 88 
Marketed Output 100 - 100 94 103 61 96 73 81 
Tobacco: 
Producer Price 100 111 104 94 80 63 75 67 60 63 69 
Marketed Output 100 - 113 109 158 122 165 159 104 
Subsistence Agriculture 100 - - 113 111 125 140 152 170 186 
Sources: Calculated from World Bank, Economic Memorandum on Tanzania. June, 1981 Tables 2.2, 6.1, 6.2, and 
Bank of Tanzania, Economic Management Report No. 5 June, 1981. 
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At one level the severity of the crisis is overstated by relying on 
official data. While all of the above is true with regard to the organized 
and government controlled sectors, the parallel markets in fact provide some 
relief to the farmers. If parallel markets exist there must be both buyers 
and sellers. Furthermore, there is the option of production for own use 
within the rural areas. The apparent rapid increases of non-officially 
marketed output which is some combination of own-consumption and sold through 
parallel markets suggests strongly (if the data are to be believed) that total 
rural production and income have not fallen but, in fact, have risen 
considerably.25 As such some of the basic needs objectives have in fact 
been sacrificed less that might appear at first glance. 
There are at least five reasons that such a dynamic cannot be accepted 
with equanimity despite the overstatement of real decline. 
1. Trade in parallel markets requires that there be both sellers and buyers. 
If farmers are voluntarily selling their output unofficially, it must be for 
the purpose of buying goods that they desire. Some of these goods may well be 
produceable in rural areas using local skills and raw materials leading to 
more specialized but localized rural economies that economize on both imported 
inputs and transport. To the extent that this happens, it may be desirable. 
But certainly many of the goods being purchased - soap, cooking oil, kerosene, 
matches, sugar, salt,. textiles, etc. - are merely redirected from official 
channels at higher nominal prices. But given the absolute levels of such 
supplies, substantial quantities must also be imported clandestinely. Now to 
the extent that cash crops are being exchanged across the borders of the 
country for these basic goods increases both real exports and imports relative 
to officially recorded quantities. Since costs of evading controls on both 
sides of the border are substantial (both real costs of distribution plus 
inducements to officials to allow the transaction), it is likely that the real 
terms on which farmers exchange agricultural goods for consumption items, and 
most certainly the terms on which urban wage earners and self employed can 
obtain food and essential goods, are less formidable than would otherwise be 
possible. There. may well be substantial dead weight loss imposed on the 
system by the necessity for evading controls. Furthermore, attempts to 
enforce controls are costly in terms of scarce administrative manpower. 
2. Given the foreign exchange allocation system, the central role of 
parastatal enterprisers, the existing systems of controls, and characteristics 
of different commodities, systematic distortions are introduced by parallel 
markets given the legal restrictions placed on them and the disincentives for 
managers to try to do so. The result is twofold: absolute preferences are 
given to such enterprises for official allocation of scarce inputs at the 
expense of more efficient small and medium scale enterprises; 26 the absolute 
scarcity of inputs reduces utilization of existing capacity giving rise to 
real losses to the economy as finished goods are imported illegally at higher 
real cost to the economy in some cases, and in reduction of productive 
employment in these sectors.27 Furthermore some goods are more readily 
obtained in parallel foreign trade markets depending both on availability 
through such channels and physical characteristics that make them easier to 
smuggle. For example, maize and coffee are more readily available for export 
through these channels than are many manufactured goods; soap is easier to 
import than fertilizer or petroleum. Thus the structure of production shifts 
towards comparative advantage in some sectors while moving it away in others. 
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3. By escaping official channels, substantial government revenue is lost. 
There may be private gain to individuals or groups who can escape the tax 
burden but at the expense of curtailing achievement of basic needs that must 
be provided through government. 
4. The existence of parallel markets may facilitate capital outflow. While 
goods will be offered for sale by farmers and small scale producers only in 
exchange for real consumer goods, the shortage of rural consumer goods is so 
great the substantial profits can be made in such trade and part of these 
profits can then be exported for foreign assets. The more precarious such 
trade is seen to be, and the more traders in the sector see their long-term 
livelihood in this economy coming under threat, the more likely is this to 
occur. There is absolutely no way to ascertain how large this effect may be 
and it is certain that at least a substantial part of parallel exports is 
exchanged for parallel imports. 
5. Morale of government officials, party leaders, and ordinary citizens is 
eroded seriously by the breakdown of official systems. While it is hardly 
quantifiable, the importance of the effect must not be underestimated. 
Tanzania is governed by a highly motivated and idealistic leadership. Critics 
to the contrary, the problem of corruption, while real, is perceived relative 
to the high ideals and past practices of the bureaucracy and leadership. In 
comparison with most African economies, most of which are more "market 
oriented" than Tanzania,. the level of official rectitide in Tanzania is 
impressive. But it is under severe threat and once the system breaks down, it 
will be virtually impossible to reconstruct in face of widespread cynicism. 
V: What Tanzania Can Do 
Frances Stewart has already outlined a package of policy measures that can 
be taken by Tanzania to alleviate the immediate crisis. They appear to be 
feasible, consistent with Tanzanian socialist and basic needs oriented 
objectives, substantially different from conventional balance-of-payments 
adjustment packages, and painful to implement. But alternatives appear even 
more painful. 
In this section we will outline a number of policy directions that appear 
consistent with Tanzania's aspirations and goals that will improve her 
prospects for meeting basic needs. The list is hardly startling - most are 
measures that Tanzania already has followed with some considerable success in 
the 1970's as was shown in section I. But there is a subtle shift in emphasis 
required to remedy the principal structural flaw that has been revealed in the 
preexisting strategy - the inability to maintain command over imports. These 
general directions are broadly consistent with the stated objectives and 
procedures of the Natural Survival Plan.28 However, we have been refused 
access to the details of that plan and so cannot comment at all on the degree 
to which it is internally consistent with, and likely to achieve its goals• 
But there is a sense in the Natural Survival Plan statement that the necessary 
measures can be temporary and that the previous growth plan can be 
resumed.29 We are suggesting that a more permanent structural adjustment is 
required, 
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A: Permanently Increase Rural Production 
All Tanzanian policy makers, planners, and observers agree that 
agriculture is the basis of the economy and will continue to be dominant for 
the forseeable future. This is not to discount, or even defer, structural 
change within the economy. But so long as the majority of the population 
resides in the rural areas, and, despite apparent closing of the income gap 
with the urban areas, contain the majority whose basic needs are not 
adequately met, measures must be taken to increase the real incomes in rural 
areas. 
Furthermore as we have seen food remains the most basic need so that 
sufficient surplus food must be mobilized from the farmers to feed the 
non-agricultural population. The persistent structural problem facing 
Tanzania has been the inability to command sufficient imports required for 
enhancing productivity and meeting other basic needs. For the forseeable 
future, the agricultural sector will have to generate the bulk of foreign 
exchange earning or saving. Finally, a surplus must be mobilized for the 
provision of government services and to undertake investment. Only the 
agricultural base can provide the bulk of the mobilizeable surplus. 
As Livingstone points out in his chapter on agriculture, the emphasis must 
be principally on small-scale production units, whether private or communal, 
on the basis not only of equity but also of efficiency in a foreign exchange 
and capital scarce economy. Despite analyses that assume small scale 
producers to be inefficient, backward, and unresponsive to incentives, the 
Tanzanian experience shows quite clearly that small scale units are extremely 
responsive to incentives and have been prompt to adopt new technology and 
practices that are manageable at the farm level and can in fact improve real 
income standards. 
If Tanzania is to achieve national goals of food self sufficiency and 
increase exports, total rural production must increase and substantially 
larger quantities must be delivered to marketing channels• In Tanzania 
different and often conflicting signals are provided to farmers: there are 
exhortations, target setting and in some cases, compulsion intended to 
increase output and deliveries; 30 and material incentives offered through 
prices and subsidized inputs. It has clearly been no contest - material 
incentives have won hands down! As Hyden has described it, the peasant is an 
elusive quarry _who remains uncaptured by the government. Attempts to 
"exploit" peasants, contrary to many radical analyses, come to little since 
the peasant has a ready fall back position in subsistence production and 
participation in parallel markets.31 This is not to say that peasants 
cannot be persuaded to work in communal units - it does, however, say that it 
is unlikely that they will do so unless they receive demonstrable benefits 
from doing so. 32 
In recent years Tanzania has recognized the importance of agricultural 
pricing for providing incentives to farmers. Tables 11 and 12 show quite 
clearly that they have been effective to some degree at least in switching 
among crops and Ndulu's evidence is very strong to that effecc.33 However, 
discussions of price incentives in recent months have too often missed the 
essential point that prices only have incentive effect if goods are available 
for purchase with the income from sales. The underlying theory that 
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identifies prices as incentives assumes that goods can be freely bought and 
sold at prevailing prices. All of the estimates of producer prices presented 
in Table 11 have to be gross overestimates for recent years when basic 
consumer goods have been totally unavailable or purchaseable only at much 
higher than official prices in recent years O As a result, the true "real" 
producer prices for officially marketed crops are probably somewhere between 
1/3 and 2/3 of the real prices corrupted by the use of the National Price 
Index. This is a primary explanation of the extraordinary rise of the 
subsistence sector. See the technical appendix for a further elaboration of 
the role of prices and quantities of goods available in influencing production 
and marketing decisions. 
Therefore, the most important single policy to raise marketed agricultural 
production of both food and export crops, is to immediately increase 
availability of the six or seven essential commodities now in short supply 
particularly in rural areas - soap, kerosene, cooking oil, sugar, batteries, 
and perhaps cloth.34 
The other measures, well covered in Livingstone's chapter, include 
provision of appropriate inputs, reducing marketing costs and margins, 
facilitating intra regional trade from surplus to deficit areas, and 
rehabilitation of the infrastructure. 
B: Concentrate Industrial Output on Essential Consumer Goods, Agricultural 
Inputs, and Significant Opportunities for Large Foreign Exchange 
Generation or Savings 
The Basic Industrial Strategy Adopted in 1977 contained seven principal 
elements:35 
1° Basic consumer goods especially if there are backward linkages to domestic 
raw materials. 
2. Intermediate goods that are inputs into construction, agriculture, and 
manufacturing. 
3. Pre-export processing of primary exports. 
4. Build light engineering capacity leading to linkage with an integrated 
iron and steel industry. 
5. Selected emphasis on small scale decentralized labor intensive units. 
6. Develop technological adaptation and innovation capacity in industry and 
the educational sector. 
7. Continuation of the development-centre pattern of decentralization for 
large- and medium-scale industry. 
Both the achievements and problems of this strategy are well covered in 
Bienefeld's chapter. Clearly the dominant feature of the current situation is 
the extremely low rates of capacity utilization caused primarily by lack of 
foreign exchange allocations for essential materials, intermediate goods, and 
spare parts. 
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In the long run, more attention must be paid to the ability of industry to 
in fact save or earn foreign exchange. To merely point to import substitution 
is insufficient and while the generation of external economies and dynamic 
productivity gains from learning are appropriate goals, the domestic and 
foreign exchange costs of doing so must be in line with reasonably expected 
benefits. As we have pointed out earlier, even a successful import 
substitution strategy will, in a growing economy, increase the absolute 
requirements for foreign exchange inputs, 
Our recommendation is that in the medium run more emphasis must be given 
to objectives 1, and parts of 2, 3 and. 5 plus explicit attention being given 
to additional areas in which industries can become net generators of foreign 
exchange. 
In the previous section we emphasized the crucial importance of the six or 
seven essential consumer goods as incentives for marketing rural production. 
The first role of industry should be to provide those. goods as efficiently as 
possible. Many of them can best be produced in small scale labor intensive 
decentralized units. Efficient production of agricultural inputs and 
implements (e.g. ox-drawn implements) can play an essential role in increasing 
agricultural output if they in fact become dependably available at reasonable 
cost. Pre-export processing. of primary exports must be adopted not as a 
binding rule of thumb but rather should be undertaken if and only if the 
additional value· added is sufficiently large in relation to the costs, 
particularly direct and indirect foreign exchange costs, of processing.35 
C: Give Priority to the Transportation Sector 
There is no more pervasive problem in Tanzania today than that of 
transport. Marketing of both food and. export crops is hampered by inadequate 
transport as is the delivery of basic consumer goods to the rural areas. 
Surplusses can only be mobilized from the agricultural sectors on terms that 
are attractive to producers if transport is reasonable in cost and reliable in 
service. 
The chapter on transport discusses the issues in more detail but the main 
areas for action include: 
1. Rehabilitation of the existing fleet of vehicles and rolling stock through 
spare part import and improved maintenance. 
2. Improve the utilization of the operative fleet through reduction of 
wasteful empty back hauls that are now pervasive. This requires major 
organizational change in the entire system of ownership and control of 
vehicles. 
3. Place high priority on maintenance and rehabilitation of both roads and 
tracks which have lapsed into terrible condition. 
D: Maintain Government Provision of Basic Needs Oriented Services 
As is evident from the chapters on health, 
there has been great progress in providing the 
portion of the country, But performance is 
water supply and education 
basic facilities to a large 
threatened by insufficient 
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provision of recurrent funding; medicines, pump fuel and parts, and teaching 
materials are scarce. In each sector it is clear that recurrent funding must 
be increased to make better use of the existing facilities. But fiscal 
stringency should not be allowed to cut these essential services although more 
appropriate means of financing them may be found, 
E: Reduce Development Expenditure in Favor of Recurrent and Maintenance 
Expenditure 
Tanzania's rate of investment, well over 20% of GDP for a sustained 
period, has been too high. While this seems paradoxical in light of 
conventional growth theory which stresses capital investment as the way to 
grow, it is clear that the capacity to build has grown much fasterthan the 
capacity to maintain, provide necessary complementary recurrent inputs, and in 
some cases manage the facilities already in place. In every sector of the 
economy, agriculture, industry, transportation, health, water, education, the 
story is the same - low utilization of existing capacity. Technically this 
appears as rising incremental capital - output ratios (ICOR's) in each sector 
and in the aggregate - practically it raises questions about the absorptive 
capacity of Tanzania with.respect to investment. 
While the National Survival Plan recognizes this requirement for the short 
run, it envisages. return to the same high levels in the future. Green et. al, 
argue that investment cannot be sacrificed.36 But the purpose of investment 
is to increase the capacity of the economy to meet basic needs over time and 
savings, at any point in time, must come at the expense of currently required 
basic needs. Although a large portion of Tanzania's investment has been aid 
financed, it still has not been costless, It is foolish to sacrifice present 
levels in situations where future levels are imperceptably enhanced through 
inability to use the new capacity to effect. 
Over time Tanzania's capacity to service and use installed capacity will 
increase and as this. ability increases, the level of investment should again 
be raised. 
F. A Foreign Trade Policy Giving Rise to Enhanced Import Capacity Must be 
Developed 
To date Tanzania has not developed a systematic foreign trade policy. In 
the past this was the result of holding unrealistically high expectations for 
performance of traditional exports without a firm basis for such productions 
and lacking systematic programs and policies for achieving such performance. 
Further weaknesses in cooperatives and later parastatal crop marketing 
authorities has made the situation worse. Following the 74-75 drought and 
crisis, policy shifted sharply to encourage food production which we have seen 
came partly at the expense of traditional cash crops. Increasing domestic 
demand for cotton and tobacco reduced further exports of these crops relative 
to production. As was discussed previously the industrial plan included 
export processing of primary crops to value added and looked generally to 
import substitution as a strategy. Additional thought was given to export of 
manufactures but not as an integral part of industrial strategy. It is now 
time to survey systematically the prospects for generating and saving foreign 
exchange on a reasonably long-term horizon,37 
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The conceptual issue is quite clear. As we argued earlier, Tanzania 
should divert as few domestic resources away from meeting domestic needs as 
possible in order to obtain the set of imports required to maximize basic 
needs achievement and reach growth targets. One approach would be to 
calculate the volume of imports required to achieve the level and composition 
of output desired and the rate of growth of import capacity that this will 
require. It. is most certainly clear at the present time that there are few if 
any unessential imports coming in and we have shown that domestic output is 
severely constrained by the lack of imported inputs. 
It is then possible to calculate the amount of domestic resources and 
imported intermediates required to generate a unit of foreign exchange in 
different activities and those requiring the fewest resources should be 
expanded. Additional consideration should be given to the degree of fixed 
commitment to a particular product that is involved since there is clear 
advantage in maintaining a flexible and diversified structure that can adapt 
to changing world market conditions. By this criteria preference will be 
accorded to annual crops over tree crops, to manufactured goods that can also 
meet domestic demands over specialized factories for which there is little 
domestic demand when domestic resource costs of earning foreign exchange are 
roughly comparable. 
While in. the short run it is most natural to activate excess capacity 
where it exists in traditional exporting activities - e.g., harvest sisal, 
cashews and coffee more intensively, use existing processing capacity for tea, 
cotton ginning, and tobacco curing more fully to earmark a fixed proportion of 
output for export, in the longer run it is necessary to identify those export 
activities with the most favourable prospects. In the short run one can 
identify those activities with high supply elasticities relative to their 
direct and indirect import requirements and offer combinations of producer 
subsidies and exchange rate adjustments that will maximize the foreign 
exchange gain. For the longer period, the mix of exports may well be shifted 
although such responses will be less immediate. Thus combinations of import 
allocations for inputs and transport, producer prices, availability of 
incentive goods for purchase with earnings, and the associated financing and 
organizational adjustments that will increase exports most quickly must be 
undertaken but should not lock the economy into a pattern that cannot be 
shifted over time. 
In the present debate in Tanzania a distinction is generally made between 
food crops and export crops and it is frequently stated that incentives that 
cause traditional export crops to be expanded will cause corresponding 
reductions in food availability. (This is the partial vs. total elasticity 
that Stewart discusses,) But in Tanzania it must be noted that food crops are 
imported when marketed supplies are less than urban demands. There is no good 
reason why food cannot be exported as well if this is a surplus. So long as 
cotton and maize, tobacco and paddy, are all tradeable commodities, the issue 
of relative prices for the crops should be determined by their relative world 
market valuations in relation to the domestic resources required to produce 
them, An expansion of maize or paddy production that allows for a reduction 
in imports has the same effect on freeing up foreign exchange for other 
allocations as an increase in tobacco or cotton exports unless, at the margin, 
food imports are more likely to be available on concessional terms than other 
imports. The incentive issue is to raise producer prices in relation to 
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availability of basic consumer goods so as to draw production out of parallel 
markets and retain production for subsistence into official markets for export 
and import reduction. The latter may be a problem to the extent that the 
reduction is retained production reduces food availability for important rural 
groups. That, in turn, depends on the extent to which real basic needs 
satisfaction would be increased by farmers voluntarily exchanging staple crops 
for sugar, soap, cooking oil, etc., to what extent the availability of such 
incentives causes farmers to devote more labor to production, and the extent 
to which enhanced input availability increases total production. 
Thus the issue is not really one of food crops vs. cash crops but rather 
on the means by which necessary foreign exchange can be earned with the 
minimum sacrifice of the current ability to meet basic needs. 
G. Price Policies Need to be Used More Generally as Administrative Devices to 
Achieve Goals 
By now Tanzanians have. become weary of outsiders advocating greater use of 
the price mechanism. Some of the advocates of markets and prices argue 
crudely that free market forces will invariably lead to an optimum use of 
resources if only government keeps clear of trying to influence outcomes. 
Tanzania has opted for Socialist development in order to meet basic needs and 
achieve an equitable society. In the minds of many, the use of prices and 
markets is synonomous with capitalixm - planning and administrative control of 
resource allocation is the hallmark of socialism. In fact this distinction 
can be quite misleading as most capitalist economies use a wide range of 
planning tools and administrative controls and many socialist countries 
(especially Yugoslavia) use price mechanisms extensively. Tanzania too uses a 
mixture of prices and administrative controls. There are no pure cases where 
only one or the other is used. 
The principal advantage of using prices as administrative devices is that 
they provide information at low cost to a large number of decentralized units 
that use them to guide their decisions. These units may be individual peasant 
families, communal groups, private firms or parastatal enterprises. Given 
incentive systems guiding behavior of the units, the "correct" set of price 
signals cause behavior of these thousands of units to be directed towards 
desired ends. Thus the power to set or influence prices and incentive systems 
is the power to direct resource allocation. 
The obvious objection to the unfettered use of self-adjusting market 
forces in an economy is that private asset accumulation leads to differential 
savings rates causing assets, wealth, and income to become increasingly 
concentrated. In turn the pattern of demand will reflect this income 
distribution giving rise to a pattern of production geared to meeting the 
demands of the rich. In turn this leads new investment to become concentrated 
in sectors catering to these demands so that the production structure becomes 
more and more directed away from meeting basic needs of the masses. Trickle 
down theories to the contrary, if such a private economy does not generate 
sufficiently high growth rates to absorb a growing proportion of the labor 
force, such an outcome is quite likely. (Liberia provides a good example of 
this process). 
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Tanzania is committed to an alternative dynamic in which the structure of 
production is to be shaped to meet basic needs and in which large-scale 
private capital accumulation is to be prevented. The former goal is 
influenced by the state's high degree of control over investment through 
fiscal mobilization of savings and external assistance, through control of 
much investment by parastatal enterprises, through control of credit by a 
completely nationalized banking system, and by direct allocation of foreign 
exchange only to approved investment projects. The latter objective is 
influenced by a highly progressive tax system, the prohibition of private 
investment in strategic sectors, price controls intended to restrain profit 
levels, and a leadership code which prohibits officials from owning 
businesses• This range of policy instruments is potentially sufficient to 
achieve these twin objectives. At the same time, these instruments lodge 
immense power in the state apparatus and the only limitations on turning these 
powers to alternative ends is the ability of peasants to evade capture through 
the subsistence and parallel market sectors, and the morale, commitment, and 
discipline of the political leadership and administrative cadre. 
The capacities of government administration and parastatal management are 
stretched thin in Tanzania. If the sheer number of administrative decisions 
required can be cut down, more care can be given to making sure that strategic 
decisions are taken with understanding and implemented effectively. These 
strategic decisions must include the degree to which savings are to be 
mobilized; the sectoral composition of investment; the main directions and 
thrust of government service delivery programs; the level and incidence of 
taxes and subsidies; the main elements of international trade policy; 
negotiation of aid from external donors; the allocation of scarce foreign 
exchange credit, and other resources to different productive sectors; wage 
policies for the government and parastatal sectors. This is no mean set of 
tasks to be assumed in addition to the normal governmental roles of 
maintaining law and order, national defense, international relations, etc., 
etc. 
To add to this list of strategic decisions to be taken is the requirement 
that a steady flow of reliable information must be made available in order to 
monitor performance and revise decisions as needed. If in addition, the 
implementation of these decisions requires thousands of judgmental 
administrative decisions on individual allocations of foreign exchange, 
commodities, acreage requirements, etc., the system is likely to break down. 
And the possibility of breakdown is greatest when the divergence between 
individual demands and administrative requirements are large. If prices 
provide signals for individual units to demand more than is available, the 
pressures on administrators become unbearable, most applicants are 
disappointed, and incentives become overpowering for misuse of official 
positions. 
The only long-term solution to extreme scarcity is increased production. 
The long-run management of scarcity is made easier if prices provide signals 
that create incentives for producing desired goods and restrict demands for 
scarce or less desired goods. Thus if the incentive systems are well designed 
the central bank will have to make fewer detailed foreign exchange allocation 
decisions; the price commission will need to control fewer prices in detail; 
and the trading companies will have to make fewer rationed allocations.38 
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This brings us to the controversial issue of the exchange rate, Green~ 
al, argue that che deliberate decision !!2,! to use the exchange rate as a 
policy instrument was appropriate and they justify it on the basis that price 
elasticities of supply of export commodities are low; that a "correct" 
exchange rate would be a multiple rate too complicated to administer; that it 
would worsen income distribution by shifting income from poor food sellers to 
rich export crop growers, from import-consuming wage earners to businessmen; 
that it might well give rise to import of amenities and export of capital; and 
that it is less selective than more flexible and precise domestic 
instruments ,39 Each of these points is debatable and there is considerable 
evidence in favor of reasonably high elasticities of response as we have 
argued in a previous section. The income distribution questions are less 
clear than they suggest - the relative wealth of export crop growers and food 
crop sellers may well be the same (and frequently they are the same persons) 
and anyway, we have argued that food vs, cash crops are not the relevant 
issue, The selectivity question deserves more attention, 
A devaluation is exactly equivalent to placing a uniform rate of subsidy 
on all exports and the same rate of tariff on all imports, The result is that 
imports become more expensive and exporters receive higher domestic prices for 
their goods, If the domestic prices of factors of production (wages, profit 
rates) and local commodities remain unchanged producers will shift their 
resources away from producing for the local market towards producing exports 
and import substitutes, If there is no such shift, because producers are 
unresponsive to changing incentives or if all domestic prices increase 
proportionally to the prices of imports and exports, there will be no change 
in incentives and either way the pattern of production will remain unchanged, 
Since almost all observers including Green et, al, agree that the quantity of 
imports that can be commanded by Tanzania's exports is determined by dollar 
(or Sterling or Yen) prices for both kinds of goods in foreign markets, there 
will be no change in the quantity of imports available to Tanzania unless the 
policy causes an increase in exports through shifting resources from domestic 
to export or import replacing production, 
In an economy like Tanzania's, the demand for imports is likely to be 
extremely inelastic and if imports were to be curtailed, production (both 
domestic and export) would fall further, Thus it is essential in an import 
constrained economy like Tanzania's that any policy measure increase, not 
decrease, the real imports that can be obtained, It is also clear that at any 
initial point, an increase in exports must divert resources from domestic 
uses, Some part of the economy will have to be squeezed in order to release 
resources, However, if real imports can be increased and if their 
availability causes total production to increase, the exercise may be 
relatively costless although a permanent change in the incentives to generate 
exports will be required to maintain the new pattern of resource allocation, 
If such a change were sucessfully brought about by levying a uniform 
tariff on imports and subsidy to exports, the revenue on tariffs would be at 
least sufficient to finance the subsidies. But if that were the desirable 
policy, it would be administratively simpler to have the Central Bank 
automatically collect the tariff by requiring importers to pay more shillings 
for each dollar's worth of imports and transfer it to exporters by given them 
more shillings for each dollar's worth of exports, That is exactly what a 
devaluation does, It might well be argued that a uniform tax on all imports 
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is a blunt instrument since the effects of increased prices will not be the 
same for all imports, For example fats that are required to produce cooking 
oil and soap which are basic incentive goods should not be charged the full 
tax while less essential imports should bear a higher share of the tax and 
perhaps non-essential imports like beer should be taxed even more, The 
argument is valid and obviously the devaluation can be accompanied by changes 
in tax rates so as to achieve this result. The pro'blem is that at the present 
time there are, and will still need to be, some controls on foreign exchange 
allocations so that virtually all imports are essential and there are few 
domestic candidates for increasing the tax base that have not already been 
tapped, It is likely therefore than candidates for exception to uniform 
increases in tariff rates will be relatively few, Luxury goods already bear a 
much higher tariff which would be further increased by the devaluation so that 
differential treatment of those goods. would persist - at the present time they 
are anyway prohibited effectively by the foreign exchange allocation system, 
Similarly, all exports might well. not require the same effective subsidy 
in order to generate a desired increase in exports. Goods in inelastic supply 
should receive less subsidy or producers will only receive windfall gains 
while goods with very high supply elasticities should receive more subsidy. 
Such adjustments can also be made by accompanying a devaluation by 
simultaneous adjustments in export taxes, Again the issue is whether it is 
simpler to finance the average subsidy through the automatic mechanism and use 
the tax instruments only for exceptions - the answer is determined ·by how 
numerous are the exceptions, 
The purpose of this section is not to argue the extent and speed with 
which devaluation should be undertaken at the moment (if at all), but to 
identify the criteria to be used for establishing the way in which exchange 
rates whould be set over the longer run, The foregoing argument leads to two 
negative conclusions: it is no.t true. that any exchange rate is an good as any 
other since there are alternative instruments to accomplish the same 
objectives; and it is also not true that there is an equilibrium exchange rate 
determined in world markets independent of domestic policies, An appropriate 
exchange rate is the one that with minimum administrative cost and complexity 
provides incentives to generate at least domestic cost the quantity of exports 
required to command the minimum level of imports needed to provide maximum 
satisfaction of basic needs and maintenance of investment. This will imply 
continued austerity in imports and even, given the distribution of income 
after progressive taxes and wage policies, there is likely to be excess demand 
for luxury imports in absence of prohibitive tariffs, So long as that 
persists, as it should given Tanzania's goals; there will remain some 
incentive for smuggling out exports in exchange for luxury imports thereby 
evading the high taxes or quantitative restrictions, That, however, is far 
more manageable in the Tanzanian context that trying to counter the present 
pervasive incentives to use parallel markets for obtaining even the most basic 
commodities, And the more automatic is the tax and subsidy system 
administered by the exchange rate, the lower will be the direct administrative 
costs of determining taxes and subsidies, the less will be costly delays in 
payment, and the less will be the incentives for evading specific taxes or 
claiming fraudulent subsidies, 
This is the long run goal for setting an appropriate exchange rate, At 
present it is clear that something must be done to increase command over 
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imports, Such adjustment must be accompanied by an expansion of production -
not a contraction of imports which would be disastrous, Stewart has outlined 
a feasible and moderate approach to move the exchange rate in the appropriate 
direction as part of an overall package including large immediate infusions of 
imports to get the process of expansion started, The eventual level to which 
the rate needs to be adjusted cannot be predicted with accuracy but it is 
certain that the more production and exports respond to the package the 
smaller will have to be the eventual adjustment, Given the time lags required 
for response and the effective control of short-term speculative capital 
movements, a gradual approach as suggested appears to be reasonable, 
VI: What Must the International Community Do? 
The plight of the least developed oil importing countries, of which 
Tanzania is a prime example, is well summed up in the most recent World 
Development Report: "While many of the better-off developing countries have 
been able to expand exports and borrow extensively in commercial markets, for 
most of the poorer countries these pressures come at the end of a decade in 
which they have made little or no progress, • , • But the majority of the poor 
countries of Asia and Africa suffered reduced growth in the 1970's, 
participated negligibly in the expansion of world trade and benefited from aid 
increases only for a short period after the first oil price. rise,• 
"Now they face the 1980' s, which have started badly for them, with no sign 
of change in either their trade or their aid prospects,· There is much to be 
improved in their domestic performance, But without more support from the 
international environment, their maximum efforts can at best yield only slow 
progress, The world will divide even !l!Ore sharply between the haves and the 
have nots, , , The 1980' s therefore pose the question how developing 
countries in general can maintain or accelera.te their growth; and how the poor 
countries in particular can find ways out of an increaseingly desperate 
predicament,•40 
President Nyerere is the most eloquent spokesman for the poor countries an 
has been calling for major reforms of the international system in world-wide 
forU!lls,41 We can add little to the case he has been !llaking, but might point 
out four major areas of reform that would be particularly i!llportant for 
Tanzania, They are: 
l, Provide higher real levels of resource transfer either through direct aid 
or i!llproved terms of trade, 
Tanzania clearly requires an enhanced ability to com!lland imports, 
2, Make such transfers more reliable, dependable, and preferably automatic 
with respect for sovereignty and the right of countries to choose their 
own path, 
The infringement of sovereignty and imposition of a set of unifom 
conditions of assistance despite differences in political and social 
objectives has been a recurrent and frequently justified grievance by 
developing countries against both bilateral donors and !llultilateral 
institutions, It is unfortunate that the developing countries !llade no 
headway at all in identifying truly internationalized resources which 
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could be shared among countries on a need-based formula. Neither the link 
proposal for distribution the proceeds of SDR creation nor the 12 mile 
limit with internationalized seabeds which would have provided for 
exploitation concession payments to an international body made any headway 
in the face of adamant resistance by the rich countries. President 
Nyerere has been raising this issue repeatedly and will undoubtedly place 
it on the agenda at Cancun with widespread commonwealth and nonaligned 
country support. The prospects for action, however, remain bleak. 
J. Assist in developing appropriate technology made widely available. 
The UNCTAD reports have stressed this theme. repeatedly as did the 
1981 Nairobi conference on energy. Yet proposals for a special fund for 
alternative energy development are stalled. 
4. Expand technical assistance and training. 
Despite general agreement on the desirability of such cooperation, 
both bilateral and multilateral technical assistance funds are at best 
remaining constant in real terms. 
While. these four recommendations are very general and apply to poor 
countries as a whole, it is only in the context of a greater international 
effort that a framework can. be established within which Tanzania can plan for 
structural adjustment without structural collapse. In addition there are two 
specific matters requiring international action in face of Tanzania's 
immediate crisis and to facilitate long term structural adjustment. 
S. Immediately redeploy aid from new projects to balance of payment support. 
Tanzania's immediate need is for foreign exchange to import raw 
materials, intermediate goods, spare parts, and limited replacement of 
worn-out capital goods in order to activate some of its unutilized 
industrial capacity, to rehabilitate the transport system, and generate 
additional agricultural production particularly in the export sectors. 
Where there will be lags in increasing production some direct importation 
of essential consumer goods, particularly soap, sugar, cooking oil and 
kerosene will be required as incentive goods in order to return marketing 
of agricultural output to official channels and increase total marketed 
output. The immediate requirements are large but so is the likely output 
response in a severely foreign-exchange constrained economy. 
However, it would be. foolhardy to expect instant results. From the time 
of commitment it will be at least six months before any significant change in 
industrial output can occur and a bit longer where extensive repair and 
rehabilitation of equipment is required. Agricultural responses will require 
a year for the first response if inputs arrive prior to the next planting 
season and some crops such as sugar require 20-22 months in the ground. If 
painful measures including redirection of investment projects and currency 
adjustments are taken with no immediate improvement of availability of goods, 
the political stability of the government will be in jeopardy. Thus a 
substantial infusion of imported goods is needed immediately on terms that 
will allow sufficient breathing space for results to emerge. 
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6. In the longer run donors must be more flexible in providing recurrent as 
well as capital inputs. 
Past donor practice which has concentrated aid on specific projects 
requiring both counterpart investment funds and recurrent foreign exchange 
inputs - e.g. a health center requires imported medicines, transportation 
equipment and replacement instruments after it is constructed has 
stretched Tanzania I s ability to use effectively the capacity that has 
already been put in place. There is a need to shift assistance from 
project to program loans which, by earmarking particular sectors for 
support, may satisfy donor requirements. However, there will remain 
continuing need for general import support for the foreseeable future (at 
least until recommendations No.land 2 of this section are acted on). 
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Technical Appendix 
The following model illustrates the role of consumer good supply, prices, 
transport costs, and marketing margins in influencing production and marketing 
decisions of basic decision units which produce partly for own consumption and 
partly for the market. In the Tanzanian context such decision units are 
usually peasant households but equally can be communal production units such 
as Ujamaa villages, cooperatives, or unions. 
While one can complicate models endlessly in an attempt to capture all of 
reality, the folowing assumptions seem to be sufficient to make the analysis 
tractable while retaining the particular elements that make it applicable to 
Tanzania: 
1. The unit has. fixed quantities of labor and land available to it -
there are no markets for either factor and we also assume the labor 
leisure choice to be independent of output. 
2. The unit can produce two commodities only one of which it cares to 
consume. The production technologies. are given; each commodity can be 
produced with variable combinations of land, labor, and intermediate 
inputs. 
3. The unit desires two commodities to consume, only one of which it can 
produce. 
4. The unit can sell as much of its output as it wishes at the base 
market price less transport and marketing costs to move the goods to 
the market. 
5. The unit can buy as much as it wants of either of its consumption 
commodities at the base market price plus transport and marketing 
costs to move the goods to the consumption point. 
6. An intermediate input (e,g, fertilizer) can be bought at its market 
price plus transport and marketing costs to move the good to the 
consumption point, The intermediate good can be used in the 
production of either output. 
7 • The decision unit has a well-defined set of preferences defined over 
the two commodities, 
After exploring the implications of this simple model, we will investigate 
relaxation of assumptions 1, 4, 5, and 6 which are too restrictive to capture 
effects of quantity restrictions or rationing, 
Figures 1-3 show what happens in the case where the good that is both 
produced and consumed (a subsistence crop) is not sold. The solid line in 
Figure 1 shows the alternate combinations that the unit can produce of M (for 
maize) which is both produced and consumed and T (for tea) which it produces 
but does not consume. This production possibilities frontier takes as given 
the endowment of land, the amount of labor services provided, the technology, 
and assumes that no intermediate input (fertilizer) is used, 
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In period one the rate of exchange between T and the non-produced 
consumption good C (for cloth) is given in Figure 2 as Pi which is 
determined by the market price of cloth plus transport and marketing and tile 
price of tea at tile market less transport and marketing, Given tilts rate of 
transformation in the market between T and C, we derive tile inner solid line 
in Figure 3 whicll is a consumption possibilities frontier. This 
transformation makes clear the role of trade in which C is "produced" 
indirectly by producing T and trading it for C and we are able to map the 
production possibilities into consumption space. Given tile preferences of the 
unit, Mi and C1 are consumed yielding utility of U1; M1 and T1 are 
produced. T1 is sold and C1 purchased • 
. In period two we have the same production possibilities but now the price 
of T has risen relative to C because transportation and marketing costs have 
been reduced by improved efficiency in the distribution sector, (Note that 
this increases the price received for T and simultaneously lowers the price at 
which C can be bought,) 
This now maps into a new consumption possibilities frontier (with tile P2 
arrow) wllich lies to the right of the first frontier, They coincide at the M 
axis since if tile unit produces only M tllere is no trade and the change in P 
has no effect, Note that for the consuming unit the improvement in 
distribution is exactly like an improvement in technology or an increase in 
factor endowment. The unit can consume more of both if it wishes but given 
its preferences it moves to consume M2C2, more C but less M, and 
production moves to M2T2• Tis substituted for Min production, 
In period three we now introduce the opportunity for the unit to purchase 
the intermediate input fertilizer in exchange for Tat the going market prices 
plus and minus distribution costs respectively, The relative prices of T and 
C remain at Pz. A new net production possibilities frontier is shown by the 
dotted line in Figure lwhich is drawn on the assumption that the unit 
purchases the quantity of fertilizer that maximizes the value of output, At 
M 
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the production point M3T3 actual T production is greater than T3 by the 
quantity that would have to be sold in order to buy the amount of fertilizer 
that has been used. One way to think of this is that it represents the amount 
of maize produced and tea left after paying for fertilizer• If the unit 
maximizes its use of fertilizer as shown, it is evident that a further 
reduction in transport costs will induce the unit to use more fertilizer and 
the net production possibility frontier shifts further rightward. The option 
of using fertilizer must, under these assumptions, move the frontier out since 
if it is too expensive relative to its productivity it will not be used and 
the initial frontier will remain unchanged. In period three the unit consumes 
M3C3, and has traded T3 for C3 plus additional T (not shown) for 
fertilizer. We show 'increased consumption and production of both goods with 
increased quantities of trade in both cash crops, consumer goods, and 
fertilizer. The particular results obtained here depend on the assumption 
that both consumption goods are normal- goods. If the subsistence good is 
strongly superior and the purchased commodity an inferior good, we will get a 
backward-bellding supply curve of marketed output, with the reverse assumptions 
we will get reduced food consumption as a result of introducing more favorable 
terms for the cash crop. With both goods being normal and introducing 
productive intermediate goods we can have more of both. In terms of the 
households' preferences, opening up trading possibilities makes it better off 
unambiguously. 
Now let us add the· possibility of also selling or buying the subsistence 
good. In !'igure 4 the Pi frontier from !'igure 3 is depicted. but now we see 
that maize can be purchased for tea along the segment AB which has a slope 
reflecting the trade off between cloth and maize. On that segment the 
producer will produce and sell enough tea to buy the quantity of cloth shown 
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additional maize so that consumption will be greater than at B, the production 
point. Similarly along the segment CD the unit will be selling enough tea to 
be at the point C but will also sell maize so as to obtain still more cloth. 
The difference in slope of AB and DC reflect the fact that if selling one 
receives the market price of maize less transport; if buying one pays market 
price plus transport. Thus the consumption possibilities frontier becomes 
ABCD and in the segment BD all maize produced is held for own consumption. If 
the transport costs on maize were to fall (but the ones on tea and cloth 
remain constant) the trading opportunity loci will shift to EF and GR so that 
the new frontier if EFGH and the segment of self sufficiency in maize (FG) 
shrinks. The limiting point is when there are no transport or marketing costs 
so that one can buy or sell freely at the same price - that is the standard 
price line so, dear to the least of international trade theorists. 
We can now c0111bine the effects of a fall in transport and marketing costs 
that affect the relative prices of selling tea, buying fertilizer and cloth, 
and buying or selling maize in Figure s. Initially the decision unit chooses 
consU111ption of M1C1 where- consU111ption of maize equals its production. The 
consumption possibilities locus is ABCD. As a result of a fall in transport 
costs the new consU111ption possibilities locus becomes EFGH and the unit 
consUllles, M2C2 withe sales of. maize in the quantity M2M2• Note that in 
this particular case retained consumption of maize rises fr0111 Mi to M2 
because the productivity of fertilizer at the price at. which it was available 
increased production such that more tea and maize were sold and more maize and 
cloth were consumed. Obviously welfare has been improved. 
Now let us relax assumptions 4 and 5 and ration quantities of cloth 
available. In Figure 6, 
FIGURE 6 
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we show the initial Mi C1 as in Figure 3 which is at point A. If instead 
of being freely available at the official relative prices Pi only C2 of 
cloth is available, only the segment BD remains as a consumption possibility 
frontier and the unit consumes M2B2 at point B. There will in this case 
be a large retreat into subsistence production and consumption. Little tea is 
offered for sale because there is nothing to buy. Now if a parallel market 
arises, offering less favorable prices than the official ones, the consumption 
possibilities frontier shifts inward to the dotted line and the unit produces 
and consumes M3 of maize and markets enough tea to buy C3 of cloth• In 
this case maize production rises and tea production falls, the unit is worse 
off than at A but better than at B. If there is also rationing or parallel 
markets for fertilizer the production possibilities curve will shift in 
further and production of both commodities is more likely to fall. 
Finally, if labor supplied is not independent of the consumption 
possibilities the production possibilities frontier will shift inwards if less 
labor is provided and outward if more is offered. Which will happen as 
transport costs fall and trading opportunities improve depends on the relative 
strength of substitution effects between leisure and goods relative to the 
income effect on leisure. Particularly, in the rationing case of point B in 
Figure 6, it is probable that the constrained producer will reduce output of 
M2 as well if the valuatiuon of the additional maize is less than that of 
the required effort. 
To this point the analysis has been proceeding with transport costs 
falling over time. But as Tanzania has made evident, the process can work in 
reverse. In light of falling relative prices of cash crops, increased 
transport costs, and rationing of essential consumer goods, it is hardly 
surprising that marketed production of cash crops has declined in favor of 
food crops, with subsistence output rising and part of it being exchanged in 
parallel markets. What we cannot tell for sure in the Tanzanian data is to 
what extent there has been substitution of leisure for production. 
Regardless, the analysis points to the critical importance of consumer goods 
being made available for incentive to sell both food and traditional cash 
crops. There are likely to be high elasticities of response of marketed 
output to such availability particularly if combined with reduced transport 
costs. Whether increases in marketed output will seriously lower subsistence 
food consumption depends on the degree to which the effective terms of trade 
are improved, the extent to which units are willing to provide more labor when 
there is something to buy, and to the yield responsiveness to intermediate 
inputs (pesticides, implements and seeds as well as fertilizers). 
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